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____________________ 
 
OPINION 
____________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 The National Labor Relations Board certified a 
collective-bargaining unit comprised of FedEx Freight, Inc. 
drivers at FedEx’s South Brunswick Terminal in Monmouth 
Junction, New Jersey. To test the appropriateness of the unit, 
FedEx refused to bargain with the unit’s certified bargaining 
representative, Local 701, contending the terminal’s 
dockworkers must also be included in the unit.1 The Regional 
Director issued an unfair labor practices order against FedEx, 
and the Board granted summary judgment in favor of the 
union. FedEx filed a petition for review, contending the 
Board (having adopted the Regional Director’s reasoning) 
abused its discretion in certifying the unit because it applied a 
unit-determination standard from Specialty Healthcare & 
                                              
1 “[T]o challenge the union’s certification the employer must 
refuse to bargain, triggering unfair labor practice proceedings 
under Section 8(a)(5).” Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 
F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1974); see also St. Margaret Mem’l 
Hosp. v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1151 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Because certification orders are not final appealable orders, 
St. Margaret had to expose itself to unfair labor practice 
charges in order to challenge the validity of the certification 
in the courts.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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Rehabilitation Center, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (2011), enforced 
sub nom. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC v. NLRB, 727 
F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013). It contends this decision violated 
Board precedent, the National Labor Relations Act, and the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, FedEx contends 
that even if the Specialty Healthcare standard applies, the 
Board abused its discretion by failing to properly apply it 
here.2 
 
 Because the Board’s interpretation of the legal 
standard to apply in unit-determination cases in Specialty 
Healthcare was reasonable, and the Board properly applied 
that standard here, we will deny the petition for review and 
grant the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order 
to bargain.  
 
I.  
FedEx provides pick-up and delivery services to 
customers throughout the United States and has a service 
center, or “terminal”—the South Brunswick Terminal—in 
Monmouth Junction, New Jersey. This terminal has an 
administrative building and a dock where freight is loaded 
and unloaded onto FedEx trucks by FedEx dockworkers. 
There is also a yard surrounding the office building and dock 
where these dockworkers move and store vehicles and 
equipment.  
 
                                              
2 The Board had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) of the 
NLRA. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the 
Board’s decision under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) because FedEx 
conducts business in New Jersey. 
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 The FedEx employees at issue here are city and road 
drivers and dockworkers.3 City drivers transport freight 
locally, and road drivers transport freight over longer 
distances. The petitioned-for unit is comprised of all drivers, 
both city and road, but excludes all dockworkers. FedEx’s 
South Brunswick Terminal employs eighty-one city drivers, 
thirty-three road drivers, and fifty-two dockworkers. All 
drivers are full-time employees, and twenty of the fifty-two 
dockworkers are full-time employees—the other thirty-two 
dockworkers are part-time.  
 
 The basic requirements for city and road drivers are 
the same—all drivers must have a commercial driver’s 
license, at least one year of relevant driving experience (or 
have gone through FedEx’s one-year dock-to-driver program, 
see infra), and have acceptable motor-vehicle reports. They 
must also submit to random drug testing and wear company-
issued uniforms. All drivers spend most of their working time 
away from the dock and are supervised remotely by 
dispatchers—operational supervisors who rotate between 
dock and dispatch supervision. In addition, either type of 
driver “[m]ay be required to perform job duties of [the other 
type of driver] or [of] a dock employee where operationally 
necessary.” J.A. 72, 74–75. 
 
The differences between city and road drivers 
primarily relate to compensation. Although all drivers’ wages 
are based on their years of experience, city drivers are paid 
between $20.63 and $24.93 per hour, whether or not they are 
driving or working on the dock. Road drivers make the same 
                                              
3 Neither party contends the South Brunswick Terminal’s 
administrative employees should be part of the unit. 
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as city drivers when working on the dock or driving locally, 
but make between $0.53 and $0.62 per mile when driving 
longer distances.  
 
 Unlike drivers, dockworkers work only in the yard or 
on the dock. Dockworkers load freight onto outbound trailers 
and unload freight from inbound trailers. They may 
occasionally drive forklifts and other vehicles within the yard 
to move equipment from place to place (“hostling”),4 but this 
driving does not require a commercial driver’s license nor 
involve the types of vehicles city and road drivers use.  
 
Moreover—unlike the requirements for drivers—no 
relevant work experience is required to be a dockworker. 
Dockworkers are also not required to wear uniforms nor are 
they subject to random drug testing. Full-time dockworkers, 
like drivers, select their schedules based on seniority. But 
part-time dockworkers do not—FedEx assigns part-time 
dockworkers to a shift when they are hired.  
 
Dockworkers also earn considerably less than drivers. 
Full-time dockworkers earn an average of $20.13 an hour—
fifty cents per hour less than the average city driver—and 
part-time dockworkers make only between $16.31 and $18.31 
per hour. Dockworkers have an opportunity to become drivers 
through the “dock-to-driver” program,5 but only about 19 
                                              
4 FedEx describes hostling as “staging trailers in the yard by 
moving an empty trailer to a specific door on the dock for 
loading, or moving a trailer that was just unloaded away from 
the dock.” J.A. 188 n.6. 
5 This program allows dockworkers to train to become drivers 
with FedEx, and includes a five-week training course to help 
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percent of FedEx’s drivers at the South Brunswick Terminal 
(24 percent of the road drivers and 16 percent of the city 
drivers) graduated from the program. No employee has 
moved in the opposite direction—from driver to dockworker.  
 
 Because drivers and dockworkers are employed by 
FedEx, they unsurprisingly have some common conditions of 
employment. All drivers and dockworkers are eligible for the 
same retirement, healthcare benefits, and personal days off 
(although part-time dockworkers do not receive paid holidays 
and cannot accrue paid vacation time). In addition, all drivers 
and dockworkers share the same break room and locker 
rooms and must abide by the “General Responsibilities” 
handbook for all FedEx employees. And, as noted, drivers 
spend a small amount of their time doing dock work. In 2012, 
about 3.5 percent of city drivers’ time and 10 percent of road 
drivers’ time was spent performing dock work at the South 
Brunswick Terminal.6 
 
II. 
 
 We first address whether FedEx preserved its 
challenges to Specialty Healthcare. In this case, FedEx 
incorporated the arguments from its previous request for 
review of the Regional Director’s unit determination in its 
Response to Notice to Show Cause. Parties often incorporate, 
rather than restate, prior arguments because of the Board’s 
                                                                                                     
dockworkers get a commercial driver’s license. Dockworkers 
work full-time as dockworkers while participating in the 
program. 
6 In 2012, this represented 14 percent of all dock work 
performed at the South Brunswick Terminal. 
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“no-relitigation rule.” Nathan Katz Realty, LLC v. NLRB, 251 
F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under this rule, “[d]enial of a 
request for review [by the Board of the Regional Director’s 
decision] shall . . . preclude relitigating any such issues in any 
related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding.” 29 
C.F.R. § 102.67(g) (2015); see also Nathan Katz, 251 F.3d at 
986 (explaining that under this rule an employer may 
“incorporate[] by reference and reaffirm[] by reference its 
post election objections”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). Here, FedEx incorporated in its Response 
to Notice to Show Cause “the reasons and legal arguments set 
forth in [its] Request for Review as the basis for its refusal to 
recognize the Union.” J.A. 217. Therefore, we will consider 
the arguments set forth in this prior proceeding. 
 
 The Board contends FedEx waived any challenges to 
Specialty Healthcare because, in its request for review, 
FedEx applied the overwhelming-community-of-interest 
standard described in Specialty Healthcare rather than argue 
Specialty Healthcare was wrongly decided. FedEx stated its 
disapproval of the Specialty Healthcare decision in a 
footnote. 
 
 Under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), “[n]o objection that has not 
been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, 
shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect 
to urge such objection shall be excused because of 
extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The crucial 
question in a section 160(e) analysis is whether the Board 
“‘received adequate notice of the basis for the objection.’” 
FedEx Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 816 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 
2016) (quoting Nathan Katz, 251 F.3d at 985); see also NLRB 
v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that because 
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the “tenor of FES’s challenge before the Board raised a 
purely factual question” and did not “provide[] the basis for 
its challenge,” FES failed to raise the issue before the Board); 
Nathan Katz, 251 F.3d at 986 (explaining a petitioner “has 
forfeited its right to challenge the Board’s disposition” when 
the petitioner “completely fails to raise an issue during an 
unfair labor practice proceeding” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 
Despite the Board’s arguments to the contrary, 
FedEx’s footnote in its petition for review provided sufficient 
notice. The footnote reads: 
 
[FedEx] posits that Specialty Healthcare was decided 
erroneously, largely for the reasons cited in Member 
Hayes’ dissent therein. However, on the assumption 
that [the] Board will not now revisit its decision there, 
[FedEx] alternatively contends that the case at bar was 
decided incorrectly even under the rule of Specialty 
Healthcare and its progeny. 
 
J.A. 183 n.4. As indicated, the footnote states clearly “that 
Specialty Healthcare was decided erroneously,” and gives as 
the basis for its challenge “the reasons cited in Member 
[Brian] Hayes’[s] dissent therein.” Id. The footnote also states 
that FedEx’s argument under Specialty Healthcare’s 
overwhelming-community-of-interest test was an alternative 
argument. Its primary argument was that “Specialty 
Healthcare was decided erroneously.” But, “on the 
assumption that [the] Board [would] not now revisit its 
decision,” FedEx focused its briefing under the alternative 
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theory. Id.7  
 
 Board Member Harry Johnson’s concurrence in the 
Board’s summary affirmance of the Regional Director’s unit 
determination indicates this footnote provided sufficient 
notice of FedEx’s Specialty Healthcare challenge. Johnson 
declined to apply the Specialty Healthcare test, finding the 
unit appropriate under the traditional community-of-interests 
test. But he recognized the employer’s argument that the 
Specialty Healthcare standard was misapplied and 
“acknowledge[d] the well-argued points of the Employer in 
this case and [in] recent cases” that the Board’s holding in 
Specialty Healthcare was incorrect. J.A. 4 n.1. 
 
 Johnson’s concurrence reflects the Board’s acute 
awareness of recent and active challenges to Specialty 
Healthcare. See Macy’s, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 15-60022, ----
f.3d----, 2016 WL 3124847, at *6–*9 (5th Cir. Jun 2, 2016) 
(addressing challenges to the unit-determination test 
described in Specialty Healthcare); Nestle Dreyer’s Ice 
Cream Co. v. NLRB, 821 F.3d 489, 498–502 (4th Cir. 2016) 
                                              
7 In a parallel case, the Eighth Circuit also held FedEx did not 
waive the Specialty Healthcare argument. See FedEx Freight, 
816 F.3d at 521 (“FedEx stated in a footnote in each of its 
requests for review of the determinations by the regional 
director that ‘Specialty Healthcare was decided erroneously’ 
for the reasons stated in Board member Hayes’ dissent. . . . 
The Board was aware of the FedEx challenge to Specialty 
Healthcare . . . . This gave the Board adequate notice that 
FedEx was objecting to the regional director’s use of the 
Specialty Healthcare framework. We therefore have 
jurisdiction to review the FedEx claims.”). 
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(same); FedEx Freight, 816 F.3d at 521–26 (same). The facts 
at issue and legal standards used in these cases parallel those 
here. It seems impossible, therefore, that the Board was not 
on notice FedEx would challenge the Board’s Specialty 
Healthcare decision.  
 
 Moreover, because the Board has refused to reconsider 
its holding in Specialty Healthcare, employers have chosen to 
challenge the validity and validation method of unit 
certifications by refusing to bargain with the union, and 
appealing these determinations to the relevant federal court of 
appeals. Accordingly, it is not surprising that FedEx did not 
pursue its challenge to Specialty Healthcare more vigorously 
in its request for review before the Board, opting instead to 
preserve its challenge for this appeal. See also FedEx Freight, 
816 F.3d at 521. 
 
 Because the Board in this case had adequate notice of 
FedEx’s challenges to Specialty Healthcare, there was no 
waiver of these challenges, and we have jurisdiction to review 
them.  
 
III.  
  
 The primary issue before us is whether the Specialty 
Healthcare Board’s clarification of its unit-determination 
analysis is reconcilable with prior Board precedent, the 
NLRA, and the APA. FedEx presses us to overrule Specialty 
Healthcare, contending it misapplied the initial community-
of-interest test and improperly created a new heightened 
standard—the overwhelming-community-of-interest test.  
 Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides for the designation 
or selection of an exclusive representative for the purposes of 
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collective bargaining “by the majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The 
Supreme Court has held that section 9(a) “implies that the 
initiative in selecting an appropriate unit resides with the 
employees” and that “employees may seek to organize ‘a 
unit’ that is ‘appropriate’—not necessarily the single most 
appropriate unit.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 
610 (1991) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, a union need 
not be representative of all employees at a company, but 
might only include employees “in a particular craft, or 
perhaps just a portion thereof.” Id.8 
 
To guide its resolution of unit determinations, the 
Board may craft rules through rulemaking or adjudication. Id. 
at 611–13. Because these rules interpret the NLRA, they are 
subject to the principles of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See NLRB v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 
U.S. 112, 123–24 (1987) (hereinafter “UFCW”). Under 
Chevron, if Congress has not “spoken to the precise question 
at issue” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the [reviewing] court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
Reviewing courts must “respect the judgment of the agency 
empowered to apply the law to varying fact patterns, even if 
the issue with nearly equal reason might be resolved one way 
rather than another.” Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 
392, 399 (1996) (internal citation and formatting omitted); see 
also UFCW, 484 U.S. at 123 (explaining we “accord[] the 
                                              
8 Section 9(b) of the NLRA grants the Board the authority to 
determine whether a unit is appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). 
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Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA 
as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the 
statute”); NLRB v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 144, 147 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  
  
A Board decision may be unreasonable if it 
incorporates new law but fails to “clearly announce[]” the 
law, as this inhibits appellate courts’ “review [of the legal 
changes] for their reasonableness and their compatibility with 
the Act.” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 
U.S. 359, 378 (1988); see also Comite’ De Apoyo a Los 
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Perez, 774 F.3d 173, 190 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Failure to consider relevant factors or provide an 
adequate explanation for an agency action are indeed among 
the wide range of reasons why agency action may be 
judicially branded as arbitrary and capricious.” (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 In Specialty Healthcare, the Board articulated a two-
step unit-determination test. First, under the initial 
community-of-interest test, the Board determines whether the 
unit is an appropriate unit, applying relevant traditional 
factors. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *15. And second, if 
notwithstanding this finding, a party contends additional 
employees should be added, the Board looks at whether the 
“employees in the more encompassing unit share ‘an 
overwhelming community of interest’ such that there ‘is no 
legitimate basis upon which to exclude certain employees 
from it.’” Id. at *16 (quoting Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 
529 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).  
 
 This heightened showing is required because “the 
statute requires only an appropriate unit” and “it cannot be 
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that the mere fact that they also share a community of interest 
with additional employees renders the smaller unit 
inappropriate.” Id. at *15 (citing Blue Man Vegas, 529 F.3d at 
421; Dunbar Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 186 F.3d 844, 847 (7th 
Cir. 1999); and Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 598, 
601 (1964)). The Board explained that although it “has 
sometimes used different words to describe this 
[overwhelming-community-of-interest] standard and has 
sometimes decided cases such as this without articulating any 
clear standard,” its evaluation of Board and appellate court 
precedent showed it had consistently applied a heightened 
standard in such situations. Id. at *17. 
 
A.  
 
 We hold the initial community-of-interest test 
described and applied by the Board in Specialty Healthcare 
was in line with Board precedent. In Specialty Healthcare, the 
Board explained that for a bargaining unit to be appropriate, 
its members must share a community of interest. This 
determination requires an analysis and weighing of 
“traditional” relevant criteria or factors. Specialty Healthcare, 
357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *15. These factors may include:  
 
“[W]hether the employees are organized into a 
separate department; have distinct skills and training; 
have distinct job functions and perform distinct work . 
. . [have] job overlap . . . ; are functionally integrated 
with the Employer’s other employees; have frequent 
contact with other employees; interchange with other 
employees; have distinct terms and conditions of 
employment; and are separately supervised.” 
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Id. (quoting United Operations, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 
2002 WL 3125799, at *1 (2002)); see also NLRB v. Saint 
Francis Coll., 562 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1977); Bartlett 
Collins Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 484, 484 (2001) (“In determining 
whether the employees possess a separate community of 
interest, the Board examines such factors as mutuality of 
interest in wages, hours, and other working conditions; 
commonality of supervision; degree of skill and common 
functions; frequency of contact and interchange with other 
employees; and functional integration.”).  
 
Applying this standard, the Specialty Healthcare 
Board noted similarities among the employees within the 
petitioned-for unit, and distinctions between them and 
excluded employees. See Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. 
No. 83, at *14. (“[Included employees] wear distinctive 
[uniforms],” have “separate and distinct” supervision, have 
“distinct wage scale,” and there was limited interaction 
between the groups). The Board also found “no evidence of 
significant functional interchange or overlapping job duties” 
between included and excluded employees, id., and 
emphasized the importance of departmental structure as an 
organizing principle, see id. at *17.  
 
 This initial community-of-interest test—and its 
application—reflects the standard used by the Board in prior 
decisions. See Macy’s, 2016 WL 3124847, at *7 (“The 
community of interest test articulated in Specialty Healthcare 
and applied in this case was taken from the Board’s 2002 
decision in United Operations . . . [and] does not look only at 
the commonalities within the petitioned-for unit” but asks 
“‘whether the employees are organized into a separate 
department . . . [and] have distinct skills and training . . . .’” 
16 
 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Specialty Healthcare, 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *14)). Accordingly, the Board’s initial 
community-of-interest analysis in Specialty Healthcare was 
not an abuse of discretion.9  
 
B.  
 
FedEx next contends the Specialty Healthcare Board 
abused its discretion by standardizing the heightened 
“overwhelming-community-of-interest” test it applies when 
an interested party claims “the smallest appropriate unit 
                                              
9 The Specialty Healthcare Board’s analysis under the initial 
community-of-interest test is also in line with our precedent. 
We have described twelve factors the Board often considers 
in unit determinations: 
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining 
earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours 
of work and other terms and conditions of 
employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work 
performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills 
and training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact 
or interchange among the employees; (6) geographic 
proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production 
processes; (8) common supervision and determination 
of labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the 
administrative organization of the employer; (10) 
history of collective bargaining; (11) desires of the 
affected employees; [and] (12) extent of union 
organization. 
Saint Francis Coll., 562 F.2d at 249 (quoting Robert A. 
Gorman, Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 
69 (1976)).  
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contains additional employees.” Specialty Healthcare, 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *15. FedEx offers three reasons for its 
conclusion. First, it contends Board precedent does not 
support the test; second, it claims the test violates section 
9(c)(5) of the NLRA; and third, it argues the test is a rule of 
general application and should have been created through 
rulemaking, rather than through adjudication. We find none 
of these reasons persuasive. 
 
1. The Board’s Unit-Determination Precedent 
 
 FedEx contends the Specialty Healthcare Board failed 
to provide a reasoned explanation for the “adoption” of the 
overwhelming-community-of interest test. Like our sister 
circuits, we believe FedEx “overstates the changes the Board 
made in Specialty Healthcare. . . . [T]he Board clarified—
rather than overhauled—its unit-determination analysis.” 
Nestle Dreyer’s, 821 F.3d at 500; see also Macy’s, Inc., 2016 
WL 3124847, at *6 (quoting Nestle Dreyer’s, 821 F.3d at 
500); FedEx Freight, 816 F.3d at 525 (“We conclude that the 
overwhelming community of interest standard articulated in 
Specialty Healthcare is not a material departure from past 
precedent . . .”); Kindred Nursing Ctrs., LLC v. NLRB, 727 
F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Board has used the 
overwhelming-community-of-interest standard before, so its 
adoption in Specialty Healthcare . . . is not new.”); Blue Man 
Vegas, 529 F.3d at 421 (explaining the Board’s unit-
determination cases “generally conform to a consistent 
analytic framework” in which, to challenge a unit that is 
“prima facie appropriate”—i.e., a unit in which the 
employees share a community of interest—the employer must 
make a heightened showing that the unit is “truly 
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inappropriate”) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 
 As the Specialty Healthcare Board explained, although 
it has used different words to describe the heightened 
standard, it has long required “a showing that the included 
and excluded employees share an overwhelming community 
of interest.” 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *16; see also FedEx 
Freight, 816 F.3d at 523–24. For example, in United Rentals, 
341 N.L.R.B. 540, 541 (2004), cited by the Board in Specialty 
Healthcare, the Board reversed the Regional Director’s 
approval of the unit because “the overwhelming and 
undisputed evidence of overlapping duties and interchange 
between the excluded employees and the petitioned-for 
employees” demonstrated the excluded employees “share[d] . 
. . a substantial community of interest with the petitioned-for 
employees.” 341 N.L.R.B. at 541–42. And in Lanco 
Construction Systems, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 1048 (2003), as 
here, the Board considered and rejected the employer’s 
argument that additional employees shared an “overwhelming 
community of interests with its solely-employed carpenters 
and helpers” requiring their inclusion in the unit. 339 
N.L.R.B. at 1049; see also Overnite Transp. Co., 322 
N.L.R.B. 723, 726 (1996) (explaining that the excluded 
employees would “constitute a separate appropriate unit and 
do not share such a close community of interest . . . as would 
mandate their inclusion in the petitioned-for unit” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 
The Specialty Healthcare Board also cited the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion in Blue Man Vegas, decided three years 
earlier, as an accurate reflection of the Board’s historic use of 
a heightened, overwhelming-community-of-interest standard 
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in such circumstances. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at *16. Citing 
various Board decisions, the D.C. Circuit explained that the 
Board’s “unit determination cases generally conform to a 
consistent analytic framework” in which, under the initial 
community-of-interest test, the Board determines whether the 
unit is “prima facie appropriate,” and then, because there can 
be more than one appropriate bargaining unit, the person 
challenging the unit must show the appropriate unit is “truly 
inappropriate.” Blue Man Vegas, 529 F.3d at 421 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Board finds a unit 
is truly inappropriate, the D.C. Circuit explained, if the 
excluded employees “share an overwhelming community of 
interest with the included employees” such that there is “no 
legitimate basis upon which to exclude them.” Id. The 
Board’s citation to and approval of the D.C. Circuit’s 
understanding of Board precedent was not an adoption of new 
law, but an attempt to standardize the phrasing of its 
“consistent analytic framework.” 
 
It is important to note, as the Fourth Circuit has, that 
some statements in Specialty Healthcare might indicate 
significant changes in Board policy. Of most importance, the 
Board seems to suggest that “whether employees are 
appropriately excluded from the petitioned-for unit is 
addressed only in step two, the overwhelming-community-of-
interest analysis, not in step one, the traditional community-
of-interest analysis.” Nestle, 821 F.3d at 500 (emphasis in 
original). This would constitute a significant change. But, as 
noted supra, under the initial community-of-interest test, the 
Specialty Healthcare Board did not look “solely and in 
isolation, [at] the question [of] whether the employees in the 
unit sought have interests in common with one another.” 
Newton–Wellesley Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 411 (1980). 
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Rather, it looked at similarities between the employees in the 
petitioned-for unit and whether their interests were 
sufficiently distinct from other employees. Because we find 
the ultimate holdings of Specialty Healthcare, with respect to 
the unit-determination standards, were not departures from 
Board precedent, we conclude the Board’s interpretation and 
clarification of the NLRA was reasonable and not an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
2.  Violation of NLRA Section 9(c)(5)  
  
 FedEx also contends the Specialty Healthcare Board’s 
overwhelming-community-of-interest test violates section 
9(c)(5) of the NLRA because it ensures the union’s choice is 
almost always the controlling factor. 
 
 Section 9(c)(5) states that “the extent to which the 
employees have organized shall not be controlling.” 29 
U.S.C. § 159(c)(5). But the extent to which employees have 
organized can still be considered. Although Congress 
“intended to overrule Board decisions where the unit 
determined could only be supported on the basis of the extent 
of organization,” it is clear from “both the language and 
legislative history of § 9(c)(5) . . . that the provision was not 
intended to prohibit the Board from considering the extent [to 
which employees have organized] as one factor, though not 
the controlling factor, in its unit determination.” NLRB v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441–42 (1965) (emphasis 
added) (internal footnote omitted). 
FedEx contends that under Specialty Healthcare, the 
union’s initial burden to show the proposed unit is appropriate 
has been truncated—instead of showing the employees are 
similar to one another and distinct from other employees, the 
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union now only has to show the employees in the proposed 
unit are readily identifiable as a group. As discussed supra, 
this is not the test. The union must first show the employees 
comprise a readily identifiable group and share a community 
of interest under the traditional test. Then, following a finding 
of appropriateness, if a party wants to add additional 
employees, it must show the additional employees share an 
overwhelming community of interest with those in the 
original unit. See Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 
at *15. Therefore, we agree with the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits that “so long as the overwhelming 
community of interest test is applied ‘only after the proposed 
unit has been shown to be prima facie appropriate, the Board 
does not run afoul of the statutory injunction that the extent of 
the union’s organization not be given controlling weight.’” 
FedEx Freight, 816 F.3d at 525 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Kindred Nursing, 727 F.3d at 565); see also Blue Man Vegas, 
529 F.3d at 423. 
 
 In accordance with the Fourth Circuit’s recent 
interpretation of its own precedent in Nestle Dreyer’s, the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in NLRB v. Lundy, 68 F.3d 1577 
(4th Cir. 1995), does not persuade us otherwise. In Lundy, the 
Board presumed the union-proposed unit was appropriate, 
and then applied an overwhelming community-of-interest 
standard. In other words, the Board never determined whether 
the unit was appropriate under the traditional community-of-
interest test, but assumed it was and skipped to the question 
of whether there was an overwhelming community of interest 
between the employees. The Fourth Circuit found this method 
effectively excluded employees suggested by the employer in 
violation of section 9(c)(5). Lundy, 68 F.3d at 1581.  
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 The facts of Lundy distinguish it from Specialty 
Healthcare. As the Fourth Circuit recently explained in Nestle 
Dreyer’s: 
 
Lundy does not establish that the overwhelming-
community-of-interest test as later applied in Specialty 
Healthcare fails to comport with the NLRA. Instead, 
Lundy prohibits the overwhelming-community-of-
interest test where the Board first conducts a deficient 
community-of-interest analysis . . . . But in Lundy we 
had no occasion to determine whether the 
overwhelming-community-of-interest test would 
offend the NLRA in a case where the Board properly 
conducts Specialty Healthcare’s step-one analysis by 
determining that the members of the petitioned-for unit 
share a distinct community of interest. With such a 
case now before us, we find Lundy distinguishable. 
 
Nestle Dreyer’s, 821 F.3d at 499. Each circuit court to hear 
this issue has found likewise.10  
                                              
10 See Macy’s, Inc., 2016 WL 3124847, at *7 (“Where the 
Board ‘rigorously weigh[s] the traditional community-of-
interest factors to ensure that the proposed unit was proper 
under the NLRA . . . the overwhelming community of 
interest’ [test] does not conflict with the Act. . . . That is 
precisely what the Board did in the instant case. As a result, 
the test and its application do not violate Section 9(c).” 
(quoting Nestle Dreyer’s, 821 F.3d at 499)); FedEx Freight, 
816 F.3d at 525–26 (“The Lundy court did not hold that any 
heightened standard violates section 9(c)(5) . . . . We agree 
with the D.C. Circuit that the use of an overwhelming 
community of interest test at the second step of the Board’s 
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 Finally, FedEx contends that even if the 
overwhelming-community-of-interest standard is not a de 
jure violation of section 9(c)(5), recent Board decisions 
suggest the test creates such an impossible standard for 
employers to meet that as applied, it will always privilege the 
employees’ proposed unit.11  This privileging occurs, FedEx 
argues, because the Board promotes the departmental or 
administrative form over all commonly shared factors, 
making the appropriateness of the unit a foregone conclusion 
in almost all circumstances.  
 
                                                                                                     
analysis does not violate section 9(c)(5) because the Board 
‘did not presume the union’s proposed unit was valid, as it 
had done in Lundy.’” (quoting Blue Man Vegas, 529 F.3d at 
423)); Kindred Nursing, 727 F.3d at 564–65 (“[T]he Board 
did not [violate section 9(c)(5) by] assum[ing] that the CNA-
only unit was appropriate. Instead, it applied the community-
of-interest test . . . to find that there were substantial factors 
establishing that the CNAs shared a community of interest 
and therefore constituted an appropriate unit. . . . Nor does the 
overwhelming-community-of-interest test violate section 
9(c)(5) . . . ‘as long as the Board applies the overwhelming 
community of interest standard only after the proposed unit 
has been shown to be prima facie appropriate . . . .’” (internal 
formatting omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Blue Man 
Vegas, 529 F.3d at 423)). 
11 Some of the cases cited by FedEx include: DPI Secuprint, 
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 2015 WL 5001021 (2015); Guide 
Dogs for the Blind, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 2013 WL 
3365658 (2013); Fraser Eng’g, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 2013 
WL 1181583 (2013); and DTG Operations, Inc., 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 175, 2011 WL 7052275 (2011). 
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 This argument is unconvincing. Even if the Board has 
approved more units organized along departmental lines—
lines often created by the employer—it does not follow that 
the Board privileges the unit determinations of the employees, 
and FedEx has not shown otherwise. Moreover, the Board has 
been clear that it will not approve “fractured” units or 
arbitrary segments of employees. See Odwalla, Inc., 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 132, at *5 (2011) (using the overwhelming-
community-of-interest test to find additional employees 
should be included in the otherwise appropriate unit because 
the recommended unit was a fractured unit—an “arbitrary 
segment” with no rational basis); see also Neiman Marcus 
Grp., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 2014 WL 3724884, at *4 
(2014) (finding there was no community of interest because 
“[t]he boundaries of the petitioned-for unit [did] not resemble 
any administrative or operational lines drawn by the 
Employer,” but not reaching the overwhelming-community-
of-interest test).  
 
 Accordingly, we conclude the overwhelming-
community-of-interest test clarified in Specialty Healthcare 
does not conflict with section 9(c)(5).12  
                                              
12 FedEx also argues the Specialty Healthcare Board 
improperly imported the overwhelming-community-of-
interest test from accretion cases, in which “new employees 
are added to an existing bargaining unit without a 
representation election; therefore, the showing of shared 
characteristics must be higher to protect employee interests.” 
Lundy, 68 F.3d at 1581 (emphasis in original). This argument 
is not persuasive. Although the “overwhelming-community-
of-interest” language from the Specialty Healthcare test is the 
same language used in accretion cases, the frameworks of the 
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 3. Rulemaking Versus Adjudication 
 Finally, FedEx contends Specialty Healthcare was 
wrongly decided because the overwhelming-community-of-
interest test was a new policy and should have been 
promulgated through rulemaking rather than adjudication. 
 
 We recognize that “the choice made between 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation 
is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the 
administrative agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
203 (1947).13 But as previously explained, the overwhelming-
community-of-interest test described in Specialty Healthcare 
was not new policy, but a consolidation and clarification of 
the heightened standard used by the Board in prior similar 
situations. Therefore, we need not address whether the Board 
abused its sound discretion in this regard.  
                                                                                                     
tests are different. Unlike in accretion cases, in unit-
determination cases like Specialty Healthcare and this case, 
the Board applies the “overwhelming-community-of-interest” 
test only after conducting an initial community-of-interest 
analysis and finding the employee-proposed unit appropriate.  
13 Moreover, the Board, “uniquely among major federal 
administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually 
all the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than 
[through] rulemaking.” Allentown, 522 U.S. at 374; see also 
Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB 
Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 Emory L.J. 
1469, 1471 (2015) (explaining the Board generally creates 
policies through adjudication rather than through 
rulemaking). 
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IV. 
 Having found the Board’s clarification of the unit-
determination standard in Specialty Healthcare reasonable, 
we consider whether the Board properly applied this two-step 
framework here. 
 
 In this case, the Regional Director, as confirmed by the 
Board, found (1) the petitioned-for unit of FedEx drivers was 
an appropriate unit under the initial community-of-interest 
test; and (2) the dockworkers did not share an overwhelming 
community of interest with the drivers such that they must be 
included in the unit.   
 
 To reiterate, under the initial community-of-interest 
test, the Board weighs a variety of factors—selected based on 
their relevance to the unit at hand—to determine whether the 
employees in the petitioned-for unit share a community of 
interest. These factors may include whether the employees in 
the unit are “organized into a separate department; have 
distinct skills and training; have distinct job functions and 
perform distinct work[;] . . . are functionally integrated with 
the Employer’s other employees; . . . have distinct terms and 
conditions of employment; and are separately supervised.” 
United Operations, 338 N.L.R.B., at *1. Applying this test, 
the Regional Director first looked at whether the union had 
shown the petitioned-for unit comprised a “clearly 
identifiable group”—i.e., whether the employees in the unit 
were internally similar or made up a fractured unit—and then 
at whether this group shared a community of interest. He 
found the group was “clearly identifiable because . . . ‘it 
track[ed] a dividing line drawn by the Employer.’” J.A. 12 
27 
 
(citing Macy’s Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 2014 WL 3613065, 
at *12 (2014)). Specifically, “[t]he petitioned-for unit [was] 
structured along the lines of classification, job function, and 
skills,” and although the dockworkers and drivers were not in 
separate departments, “there [was] no question that the 
Employer treat[ed] the driver classification differently in 
almost every operational and administrative sense.” Id. The 
Regional Director also found the drivers distinguishable from 
the dockworkers because of their uniform requirements, 
commercial driver’s license requirements, and driver-specific 
job descriptions. Id. 
 
 For many of the same reasons, the Regional Director 
found the drivers in the petitioned-for unit shared a 
community of interest. They “engaged in virtually the same 
task—moving freight from place to place,” were “distinctly 
qualified and skilled because of their licensure requirements, 
and use[d] the same type of equipment.” Id. at 13. Moreover, 
all drivers were full-time employees with the same benefits 
and similar compensation, experienced similar working 
conditions, were subjected to random drug testing, and 
applied for shifts based on seniority. 
 
 We find the Regional Director’s application of the 
initial community-of-interest test (which was adopted by the 
Board) was not an abuse of discretion. He weighed relevant 
factors to determine whether the union had shown the 
petitioned-for unit was an appropriate unit—looking not only 
at whether the employees in the petitioned-for unit were 
similar and comprised a readily identifiable group, but also at 
whether these employees were sufficiently distinct from other 
employees.  
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 The Regional Director also properly applied the 
overwhelming-community-of-interest analysis. Under this 
test, the burden switched to FedEx to show that an otherwise 
appropriate unit of drivers was inappropriate because 
dockworkers shared an overwhelming community of interest 
with them. The Regional Director agreed with the union, 
finding sufficient distinctions between the employees. He 
noted that dockworkers have no prerequisites for 
employment, whereas drivers must have a Class A 
commercial driver’s license with various certifications, and 
that, unlike dockworkers, drivers are subject to random drug 
testing because of the nature of their work. The Regional 
Director also noted the disparity in wages between 
dockworkers (including part-time dockworkers) and drivers, 
and the distinct work locations of the employees—
dockworkers “work almost exclusively within the Terminal,” 
while drivers work outside the terminal. J.A. 13. He also 
observed that dockworkers and drivers do not frequently 
interact with one another, and that there is only a one-way 
interchange between positions—from dockworker to driver 
through the dock-to-driver program.  
 
The Regional Director did recognize “a few areas of 
commonality between the three classifications, chiefly in 
common supervision,” but he concluded that “these areas 
[fell] far short of establishing the overwhelming community 
of interest between the Dockworkers and the employees in the 
petitioned-for unit that would be necessary to require the 
Dockworkers’ inclusion.” Id.  
Given the Board’s discretion to find an appropriate 
unit—not necessarily the most appropriate unit—and our 
deferential standard of review, we hold the Board’s 
conclusion that there was no overwhelming community of 
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interest was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny FedEx’s 
petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-petition for 
enforcement of its order. 
1 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment: 
 
We have routinely held that a single passing reference 
to an issue in a footnote, without squarely arguing it, is 
insufficient to preserve that issue for our review on appeal.  
See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2016 WL 
3003675, at *15 (3d Cir. May 25, 2016); John Wyeth & Bro. 
Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997) (Alito, J.).  Our sister circuits also decline to consider 
issues raised in such perfunctory fashion.1  There is good 
reason for this unanimous position.  Brief, casual references 
to arguments do not put the opposing party on adequate 
                                              
1 “Federal courts of appeals refuse to take cognizance 
of arguments that are made in passing without proper 
development.”  Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1095 
(2013); see also Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 
1253 (10th Cir. 2010); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root 
Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 
572 F.3d 502, 506 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Strong, 489 F.3d 1055, 1060 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007); City of 
Syracuse v. Onondaga Cty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 
2006); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 
1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006); United States v. Dairy Farmers 
of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850, 856 (6th Cir. 2005); IGEN Int’l, 
Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303, 309 n.3 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Sugarcane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 
289 F.3d 89, 93 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 
F.3d 248, 270 (5th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. 
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 60 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999); Bakalis v. 
Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318, 326 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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notice of the issue, nor do they develop it sufficiently to aid 
our review.  That is particularly true “where important and 
complex issues of law are presented, [so] a far more detailed 
exposition of [an] argument is required to preserve an issue” 
in that context.  Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 
(3d Cir. 1990).  Despite this well-recognized rule, my 
colleagues in the Majority conclude that a one-sentence 
statement incorporating a two-sentence footnote – which 
itself only incorporates the views briefly expressed in a 
dissenting opinion – is adequate to preserve FedEx’s 
arguments before the NLRB.  Were such a tenuous 
“argument” made before this Court, we would never consider 
it.  See United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“[R]aising an issue in the District Court is insufficient 
to preserve for appeal all arguments bearing on that issue” 
(emphasis added).).  No reason has been suggested why the 
rule for raising arguments before the NLRB should be more 
relaxed than the rule that applies in this and every other court 
of appeals, and, as explained later, there is good reason to 
believe that the rule for arguments to the NLRB should be 
even more rigorous.  I therefore respectfully disagree with 
Part II of the Majority opinion, and would conclude that 
FedEx’s arguments challenging the standard set forth in 
Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, 357 NLRB 
934 (2011), see infra note 5, were inadequately raised to the 
Board, leaving us without jurisdiction to consider them, 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).2 
                                              
2 Because I regard FedEx’s challenge to the Specialty 
Healthcare standard as waived, I would only review whether 
the Board properly applied that standard.  As to that question, 
I join Part IV of the Majority’s opinion – I agree that the 
Regional Director’s application of Specialty Healthcare in 
3 
 
As the Majority correctly recognizes, when we 
consider petitions from NLRB decisions, our jurisdiction is 
limited by statute only to a review of issues raised before the 
Board.  “No objection that has not been urged before the 
Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by 
the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection 
shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”3  
                                                                                                     
this case (which was adopted by the Board) was a proper 
exercise of its discretion.  I therefore also concur in the 
judgment denying the petition for review and granting the 
petition for enforcement. 
 
3 FedEx has not alleged that any “extraordinary 
circumstances” are present in this case to excuse its failure to 
make its arguments before the Board.  And even if it had, 
 
[a] review of the cases shows that the 
“extraordinary circumstances” provision of 
Section 10(e) (29 U.S.C. § 160(e)) (excusing 
the losing party’s failure to make objections to 
the Board) has been applied only in rare cases, 
as when a snow storm closes the Board’s 
offices, or when a telephone and taxi strike 
prevent delivery of the objections, or when an 
unusually early mail pickup delays delivery. 
 
NLRB v. STR, Inc., 549 F.2d 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam) (citations omitted); see also 1621 Route 22 West 
Operating Co., LLC v. NLRB, Nos. 15-2466 & 15-2586, 2016 
WL 3146014, at *7 (3d Cir. June 6, 2016) (noting that a 
misapplication of the National Labor Relations Act by the 
Board does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”); 
4 
 
29 U.S.C. § 160(e);4 see Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982) (“[T]he Court of Appeals 
lacks jurisdiction to review objections that were not urged 
before the Board … .”).  “The Supreme Court has construed 
this rule strictly,” NLRB v. Konig, 79 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 
1996), and we have likewise “shown unusual unanimity in 
labor cases in strictly adhering to the requirement,” NLRB v. 
Wolff & Munier, Inc., 747 F.2d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).  “[T]o effectively preserve an issue, 
the respondent’s exception must apprise the Board of the 
issue that the responding party intends to press on review 
sufficiently enough that the Board may consider the exception 
on the merits.”  Cast North America (Trucking) Ltd. v. NLRB, 
207 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Board’s rules similarly require parties to “set 
forth specifically the questions of procedure, fact, law, or 
policy to which exception is taken,” “concisely state the 
grounds for the exception,” and “specifically urge[]” any 
                                                                                                     
Advanced Disposal Servs. East, Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 
600 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that “a challenge which goes to 
the composition of the NLRB, and thus implicates its 
authority to act, constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ 
under § 160(e)”). 
 
4 Although our jurisdiction in this case arises under 
both 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f), as the parties petitioned for 
both review and enforcement of the underlying order, the 
requirement that an issue be presented to the Board for us to 
have jurisdiction “applies to both enforcement and review 
proceedings.”  Oldwick Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 
339, 341 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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exception, or risk having the argument “be deemed to have 
been waived.”  29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b). 
 
Because the preservation requirement of § 160(e) goes 
to our jurisdiction, its application is “mandatory, not 
discretionary.” Oldwick Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 
339, 341 (3d Cir. 1984).  “Th[at] rule serves a sound purpose 
… [and] we are bound by it.”  Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
440 U.S. 301, 311 n.10 (1979).  The jurisdictional bar is 
“designed to allow the NLRB the first opportunity to consider 
objections and to ensure that reviewing courts receive the full 
benefit of the NLRB’s expertise.”  Cast North America, 207 
F.3d at 1000. 
 
Here, FedEx provided two submissions to the Board.  
First, the company sought review of the regional director’s 
decision in the underlying representation proceeding.  In that 
submission, it generally argued that the regional director had 
misapplied the Specialty Healthcare standard – laying out an 
extensive factual argument about the integrated work of 
dockworkers and drivers – with, in the following footnote, 
only one brief reference to a possible legal challenge to the 
overall standard: 
 
The Employer posits that Specialty Healthcare 
was decided erroneously, largely for the reasons 
cited in Member Hayes’[s] dissent therein.  
However, on the assumption that [the] Board 
will not now revisit its decision there, the 
Employer alternatively contends that the case at 
bar was decided incorrectly even under the rule 
of Specialty Healthcare and its progeny. 
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(JA at 183 n.4.)  In the remaining twenty-three pages of its 
brief, FedEx made no other objection to the Specialty 
Healthcare standard, arguing only its proper application.  It 
also stated at the end of its brief that “[t]he Board has made 
clear that the decision in Specialty Healthcare did not create a 
new community of interest test.” (JA at 204.)  And it said that 
without comment or quarrel.  FedEx’s first submission to the 
Board is also notable for never actually applying any standard 
but the one from Specialty Healthcare.  The omission of any 
effort to apply the more “traditional” analysis is telling5 – if 
                                              
 5 As explained in the Majority opinion, Specialty 
Healthcare set out the “overwhelming community of 
interests” test, in which an employer seeking to expand a 
petitioned-for unit composed of a readily identifiable group 
that shares a community of interest must demonstrate that the 
employees it seeks to add “share an overwhelming 
community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit.”  
Specialty Healthcare, 357 NLRB 934, 946 (2011) (emphasis 
added).  In dissent, Member Hayes noted that, “in a correct 
application of the traditional community of interest test, the 
Board never addresses, solely and in isolation, the question 
whether the employees in the unit sought have interests in 
common with one another.”  Id. at 951 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In other words, the Specialty Healthcare test 
starts by looking exclusively at the commonalities of the 
petitioned-for unit, whereas the “traditional” analysis 
contrasts the employees in that unit with other employees to 
determine “whether the interests of the group sought are 
sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant 
the establishment of a separate unit.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In Member Hayes’s view, “[t]he 
‘overwhelming community of interest’ test [the Board 
7 
 
FedEx really was arguing that the Board should apply the 
traditional analysis, it should have done so itself. 
 
 Thereafter, FedEx filed its second submission to the 
Board in response to a notice to show cause in the subsequent 
unfair labor practice proceeding.  With no specificity, it 
incorporated its previous submission by reference, saying 
simply, “[t]he Employer continues to rely upon the reasons 
and legal arguments set forth in the Employer’s Request For 
Review as the basis for its refusal to recognize the Union.”  
(JA at 217.)  In the balance of its argument, FedEx again 
challenged only the proper application of the Specialty 
Healthcare standard. 
 
 Now, however, FedEx has made the strategic decision 
to change its argument into a direct challenge of that standard.  
If it had persevered in challenging only the proper application 
of Specialty Healthcare, principles of deference that bind us 
would have placed it in a difficult position.  FedEx would 
have had “to show that the Board abused its discretion in 
determining the appropriateness of the bargaining unit in 
question.”  Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 88 F.3d 1300, 
1303 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  That 
would have been an “uphill battle.”  Id.  Likely recognizing as 
much, the company chose a different fight.  So, in its opening 
brief before us, FedEx made no argument whatsoever about 
the proper application of the Specialty Healthcare standard.  
None.  Instead, it dedicated the entire twenty-five pages of 
argument to a legal challenge to the existence of the Specialty 
                                                                                                     
majority] endorse[d] cannot be reconciled with the traditional 
appropriate unit test.”  Id. 
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Healthcare standard, laying out the arguments that the 
Majority addresses in Part III of its opinion. 
 
 Perhaps it is not coincidental that we “exercise plenary 
review over questions of law and the Board’s application of 
legal precepts.”  NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., Ltd., 176 F.3d 
154, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).  We have previously held that a party 
cannot turn factual arguments raised before the Board into 
legal arguments before our Court, which is exactly what 
FedEx has done here.  See NLRB v. FES, a Div. of Thermo 
Power, 301 F.3d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that because 
“[t]he tenor of [the employer’s] challenge before the Board 
raised a purely factual question,” a related legal challenge 
was jurisdictionally barred).  But, curiously, the Majority is 
satisfied with that shape shifting.  By my colleagues’ 
reckoning, FedEx legitimately changed its argument from one 
that would have required strict deference to the Board into 
one that permitted plenary review of the Board’s legal 
conclusions.  Although FedEx has lost its challenge to the 
applicable standard – and, as I note at the end of this 
discussion, see infra note 12, I too question the legitimacy of 
the standard – we should not be entertaining the challenge at 
all. 
 
 FedEx says that its footnote was sufficient to preserve 
for our review its attack on Specialty Healthcare because 
 
the General Counsel has suffered no prejudice 
from FedEx Freight’s purported failure to raise 
the Specialty Healthcare issue during the unfair 
labor practice proceeding, unless of course the 
General Counsel is contending that the Board 
might have overturned Specialty Healthcare 
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had FedEx Freight decided to pursue its 
argument more vigorously. That, however, was 
simply not going to happen. 
 
(Reply Br. at 5-6.)  Its attorney echoed that point at oral 
argument: “It would have been fruitless for us to argue this 
below.  The Board was going to do what it was going to do.”  
Oral Argument at 05:30, available at http://www2.ca3. 
uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-2585NLRBv.FEDEX 
FreightINC.mp3 (argued March 1, 2016).  The Majority 
agrees, saying that “it is not surprising that FedEx did not 
pursue its challenge to Specialty Healthcare more vigorously 
in its request for review before the Board” because the Board 
had already “refused to reconsider its holding in Specialty 
Healthcare.”  (Majority Op. at 11.)  But there is an obvious 
difference between a strategic lack of vigor and the outright 
omission of an argument.  FedEx is, of course, free to make 
strategic decisions about which arguments to emphasize and 
which to discuss only briefly, but it must at least make an 
argument to the Board for us to have jurisdiction to review it.  
Cf. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 125 
(2007) (holding that a “futile” argument to overrule a circuit 
precedent was preserved for further consideration when the 
argument was limited only “to a few pages of [an] appellate 
brief” (emphasis added)).  That FedEx likely would not have 
prevailed before the Board in challenging Specialty 
Healthcare is irrelevant.  The jurisdictional bar of § 160(e) 
does not vary based upon the likelihood of success of the 
waived argument.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has already 
rejected the idea that a party can avoid waiver if it had “no 
practical reason” to raise a particular argument before the 
Board.  Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 311 n.10 (“If this ground 
were accepted as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ … little 
10 
 
would be left of the statutory exception.”).  Section 160(e) is 
straightforward: If an issue is not adequately raised before the 
Board, we may not consider it. 
 
 The Majority says that “FedEx’s footnote in its 
petition for review provided sufficient notice” because it gave 
“as the basis for its challenge the reasons cited in Member 
[Brian] Hayes’[s] dissent” in Specialty Healthcare.  (Majority 
Op. at 9 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  I cannot agree.  For starters, FedEx’s footnote is 
not even phrased as an argument that the Board should 
overrule Specialty Healthcare; it simply “posits” the 
company’s disagreement with Specialty Healthcare for 
“largely” the reasons in Hayes’s dissent.  (JA at 183 n.4.)  
Which reasons?  The footnote does not specify, opting instead 
to merely reference Member Hayes’s dissent and leaving it to 
the reader to guess which reasons FedEx likes.6  But my 
larger concern is that such wholesale incorporation of 
                                              
 6 Notably, the Majority does not examine the 
dissenting opinion from Specialty Healthcare that FedEx 
purported to incorporate by reference in its first submission to 
the NLRB, which is odd since that is the only place any legal 
arguments against the Specialty Healthcare standard were 
raised at all.  And, when parsed in detail, Member Hayes’s 
dissent actually makes few references to the three legal 
arguments that FedEx now advances before us.  Hayes, 
however, certainly did criticize the Board majority’s adoption 
of the “overwhelming community of interest test,” saying that 
it had “fundamentally change[d] the standard for determining 
whether a petitioned-for unit is appropriate in any industry 
subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.”  Specialty Healthcare, 
357 NLRB at 948. 
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arguments embodied elsewhere – without any elaboration of 
those issues directly to the Board – simply cannot be adequate 
to satisfy § 160(e).  Were it otherwise, parties before the 
Board would be free to repeatedly drop such footnotes and 
incorporate by reference any argument that could conceivably 
(if tangentially) be related to the proceeding in question.  That 
would effectively nullify any word or page limits that apply 
to Board proceedings and needlessly complicate the task of 
the NLRB and its members.  Indeed, there would be no 
practical limit to the ability of parties to incorporate a variety 
of arguments, from a variety of sources, entirely by reference 
in their submissions to the Board.  For similar reasons, courts 
of appeals do not permit parties to incorporate their district 
court submissions by reference.  See, e.g., Gaines-Tabb v. ICI 
Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 624 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasizing that “[a]llowing litigants to adopt district court 
filings would provide an effective means of circumventing 
the page limitations on briefs,” and collecting cases to that 
effect). 
 
 In my estimation, this case is akin to Marshall Field & 
Co. v. NLRB, in which the Supreme Court held that an 
objection to the Board that the agency had erred “in making 
each and every recommendation” was insufficient to grant 
jurisdiction for judicial review of a more particularized 
challenge.  318 U.S. 253, 255 (1943) (per curiam).  A 
“general objection” presented to the Board is insufficient to 
preserve more specific, subsidiary issues later brought to 
court, as it “d[oes] not apprise the Board that [the party] 
intend[s] to press the question now presented, and may well 
account for the Board’s failure to consider th[e] question in 
its decision and to make findings with respect to it.”  Id.  Like 
the objection in Marshall Field, FedEx’s footnoted aside was 
12 
 
far too general to pass this test.  FedEx offered no specific 
basis for its disagreement with Specialty Healthcare.  See 
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. NLRB, 692 F.3d 1068, 1073 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether § 160(e)’s ‘objection’ 
requirement is satisfied, we ask this question: was the matter 
the petitioner seeks to raise here pressed before the Board 
with ‘sufficient specificity and clarity’ so the tribunal was 
aware it needed to be addressed and could become the subject 
of litigation in this court?” (citation omitted)).  In fact, it 
qualified what little it did say, with the hedge that it “largely” 
agreed with the Specialty Healthcare dissent.  The 
jurisdictional bar of § 160(e) forecloses our review of any 
such vague argument-by-reference.7 
 
 The Majority hangs much of its contrary conclusion on 
the existence of Member Johnson’s concurrence in FedEx’s 
                                              
7 I do agree with the Majority’s conclusion that 
FedEx’s second submission was sufficient to incorporate the 
arguments of its first.  Because the NLRB has a fairly strict 
“no relitigation” rule (see Majority Op. at 7-8), parties to a 
follow-on unfair labor practice proceeding in these 
circumstances may incorporate by reference their earlier 
submission to the Board in the representation proceeding.  
The issue in this case, however, is not the adequacy of 
FedEx’s incorporation by reference in its second submission.  
The problem, rather, is that the first submission’s footnote 
was inadequate to bring FedEx’s arguments against the 
Specialty Healthcare standard before the Board.  I would not 
view the issue as waived if FedEx had made a fully-
developed argument in the representation proceeding and then 
incorporated that argument by reference in the unfair labor 
practice proceeding.  But that is not what happened here. 
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representation proceeding.  He declined to apply the Specialty 
Healthcare test for approving a bargaining unit and instead 
found the unit appropriate under the “traditional” approach.  
As a consequence, Johnson found “no need to express a view 
whether the Board correctly decided Specialty Healthcare … 
and whether the Regional Director correctly applied it here.”  
(JA at 4 n.1.)  To my colleagues in the Majority, “Johnson’s 
concurrence … indicates [that FedEx’s] footnote provided 
sufficient notice of [its] Specialty Healthcare challenge.”  
(Majority Op. at 10.) 
 
I disagree.  For one, the concurrence in question 
reflected the position of only a single member and not the 
entire Board.  The Board opinion stated that FedEx’s 
challenge “raise[d] no substantial issues warranting review.”  
(JA at 4.)  Had the Board perceived that FedEx was mounting 
a challenge to the applicable standard, that certainly would 
count as a “substantial issue.”  Also, and more importantly, 
the Supreme Court has held that the jurisdictional bar of 
§ 160(e) “applies even though the Board” has addressed and 
decided an issue.  Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., 456 U.S. 
at 666 (holding that even where the Board raises an issue sua 
sponte, the aggrieved party must seek reconsideration to the 
Board before seeking judicial review); see also Int’l Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 
281 n. 3 (1975) (imposing the same requirement); Alwin Mfg. 
Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The 
Supreme Court has indicated that section [160(e)]8 bars 
                                              
 8 In many cases, courts have referred to § 160(e) as 
“§ 10(e),” which is its section number in the National Labor 
Relations Act.  I have changed any such section numbers in 
quotations throughout this concurrence to “§ 160(e)” for the 
14 
 
review of any issue not presented to the Board, even where 
the Board has discussed and decided the issue.”).  “[T]he 
statute requires objection to the Board, and not discussion by 
the Board, before an issue may be presented in court.”  Local 
900, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 
727 F.2d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1984).9  In the past, “[c]ases 
interpreting section [160(e)] look[ed] to whether a party’s 
exceptions are sufficiently specific to apprise the Board that 
an issue might be pursued on appeal.”  Consol. Freightways 
v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Accordingly, 
we should look only to the adequacy of the objection brought 
to the Board, not the content of the Board’s opinion (or, as 
here, a one-member concurrence), to decide whether we have 
jurisdiction under § 160(e).  “[T]he fact that the Board has or 
                                                                                                     
sake of consistency, but the two sections are one and the 
same. 
 
 9 In an analogous context, the D.C. Circuit recently 
declined to address an argument that a party had not made 
before the NLRB.  See HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 
798 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  The court 
acknowledged that a “dissenting member [had] explicitly” 
addressed the argument that the party was advancing, but 
concluded that “even if this gave the [Board] majority notice 
the [rule] itself was at issue, it [was] insufficient to invoke our 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit rightly recognized that the 
jurisdictional bar turns on whether an issue is adequately 
presented to the Board by the parties, not on whether the 
Board (or any of its members) has discussed the issue in an 
opinion.  The aggrieved party had simply “failed to put this 
issue before the Board,” so the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction 
over th[at] aspect of its petition.”  Id. 
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has not discussed an issue raises no necessary inferences with 
respect to section [160(e)].”  Local 900, 727 F.2d at 1192.10 
 
The Majority also points out “the Board’s acute 
awareness of recent and active challenges to Specialty 
                                              
 10 Were that not enough, the circumstances of this case 
make Johnson’s concurrence particularly insignificant to any 
assessment of the adequacy of FedEx’s submissions to the 
Board.  It appears that, around the time of the Board’s 
decision in this case, certain members of the Board 
(particularly then-Members Hayes and Johnson) applied the 
more traditional analysis in every case involving the Specialty 
Healthcare standard.  See, e.g., Odwalla, Inc., 357 NLRB 
1608, 1611 (2011) (Hayes concurring under traditional 
analysis).  In other words, Johnson wrote this same 
concurrence regularly.  So the Majority cannot say that 
FedEx’s two-sentence footnote was what put this issue on 
Johnson’s radar, as his concurrence was a pro forma opinion 
that he used in each case that applied Specialty Healthcare, 
even, as here, when he agreed with the ultimate outcome.  In 
all, it appears he wrote at least twenty-five such footnoted 
concurrences in the period from when Specialty Healthcare 
was decided until August 20, 2015, when he ultimately 
dissented and expressed his disagreement with that standard.  
See DPI Secuprint, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 172, at *9 (2015).  
The mere fact that he included a footnoted concurrence in this 
case – a concurrence that had been replicated (often almost 
verbatim) in every other case that called for application of 
Specialty Healthcare – does not suggest that it was FedEx’s 
buried footnote that brought the issue to anyone’s attention on 
the Board.  Quite the contrary: Member Johnson would have 
included that concurrence regardless. 
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Healthcare” in other cases, making it “impossible” that it was 
not on notice of FedEx’s challenge to the standard.  (Majority 
Op. at 10-11.)  Perhaps the Majority is suggesting that FedEx 
did not even need to include its footnote to preserve the issue 
for our review – that it was enough that there was an ongoing 
debate in the ether.  But that very loose approach is not what 
§ 160(e) allows.  The statute requires that an argument be 
adequately presented to the Board, and that principle does not 
vary depending upon what issue is involved, even if the issue 
is otherwise well known.  “Simple fairness to those who are 
engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, 
requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over 
administrative decisions unless the administrative body not 
only has erred but has erred against objection made at the 
time appropriate under its practice.”  United States v. L.A. 
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).  
Section 160(e) places an obligation solely on the parties, and 
they must meet that obligation before we can exercise 
jurisdiction over their claims, regardless of any ongoing 
debates within the Board.  The statute means what it says, and 
we are not free to relax its jurisdictional requirement just 
because the particular unpreserved issue happens to be 
especially timely or of interest to particular Board members.  
Section 160(e) applies uniformly to all issues and to all 
parties. 
 
Real damage is done by permitting the kind of 
sandbagging that FedEx has gotten away with here.  Despite 
the strictures of § 160(e), the Board will now have to be 
concerned about addressing barely mentioned legal issues.  
And, by our blessing as legitimate argument FedEx’s “I 
incorporate what I incorporated when I said I largely agreed 
with a dissent” statement, we only encourage such improper 
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practice in future cases.  This is particularly troubling because 
it may be said to broaden the scope of our own appellate 
review.  After all, why should the requirements for issue 
preservation be any different for practice before the Board 
than before us?11  I cannot think of a good reason.  But, if 
there were, an argument could be made that the rules should 
be stricter before the Board.  Section 160(e) imposes a non-
waivable statutory bar on further review, grounded in 
jurisdiction rather than discretion, whereas waiver in our 
Court is a prudential doctrine to which we may choose to 
make exceptions.  Compare Advanced Disposal Servs. East, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 2016), with Wright 
v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2012).  Rigid 
adherence to § 160(e) is also important because “[t]his 
statutory provision affords the Board the opportunity to bring 
                                              
11 The Fourth Circuit, for example, applies a similar 
rule for preservation of arguments before the Board as it 
applies for preservation of arguments before it – “the 
objection process would have no worth” if “a passing 
reference [were] sufficient to preserve an objection.”  
Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. NLRB, 212 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 
2000).  A claim of error to that court must be “grounded in an 
appropriately specific objection” that was also raised before 
the Board.  Id.  In our Circuit, however, it will apparently be 
the NLRB’s job to ferret out, and fully consider, any possible 
argument that might be buried in a corner of a brief.  And if 
that rule applies to the Board, one might assume that it would 
also apply to us.  If so, parties are now free to drop footnotes 
that incorporate by reference arguments found somewhere 
else entirely – perhaps in court opinions, law review articles, 
or law blogs – and we should be willing to consider them.  
That has never been our job before, but it may be now. 
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its labor relations expertise to bear on the problem so that we 
may have the benefit of its opinion when we review its 
determinations.”  NLRB v. Allied Prods. Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 
653 (6th Cir. 1977).  Our application of § 160(e) should 
therefore strongly encourage parties to make full arguments 
to the Board in the first instance.  That, unfortunately, is not 
the incentive provided by today’s Majority opinion.12 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, I regard FedEx’s challenge 
to the Specialty Healthcare standard as waived.  I would thus 
proceed directly to the application of that standard, as does 
the Majority in Part IV of its opinion.  I concur in that part of 
the Majority’s opinion, and therefore concur in the judgment. 
                                              
 12 Were FedEx’s challenge to Specialty Healthcare 
properly before us, I would agree with the Majority’s 
understated observation “that some statements in Specialty 
Healthcare might indicate significant changes in Board 
policy.”  (Majority Op. at 19.)  In light of those changes, I 
have serious misgivings about the Board’s choice to adopt 
that standard in an adjudicative proceeding rather than by 
rulemaking.  I am also concerned that the changed standard 
seems to put a thumb on the scale in favor of the union’s 
choice of unit, thus perhaps running afoul of NLRA § 9(c)(5), 
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5), and encouraging the 
fragmentation of bargaining units.  But, interesting as those 
issues are, they do not give us license to issue an advisory 
opinion about arguments outside of our jurisdiction.  As 
FedEx did before the Board, I will content myself by noting 
that my concerns are largely those expressed in Member 
Hayes’s dissent. 
